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Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic preferences when they evaluate 
pitchers.  Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but 
mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires.  Pitchers understand the incentives and throw 
pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they 
anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities 
downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups’ behavior 
generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating 
measures of wage discrimination. 
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I. Introduction and Motivation 
Tests of labor market discrimination typically compare labor market outcomes (e.g., 
wages, promotion rates) across groups and, after controlling for worker productivity, assign any 
residual differences to discrimination.  But what if an evaluator who discriminates along the 
dimension being studied subjectively determines a worker’s measured productivity, as is true in 
all but the simplest piece-rate environments?  A worker subjected to such biased evaluations 
might appear less productive, which ordinarily would justify a lower wage.  However, in this 
case the econometrician would underestimate, or perhaps even miss altogether, instances of labor 
market discrimination when they in fact exist.   
A subtler complication is that workers, anticipating biased evaluations, may alter their 
behavior in ways intended to minimize its impact.  For example, consider a police officer who 
can either: 1) write traffic citations (the number of which can be objectively measured), or 2) 
investigate crimes (which is subject to performance review by a higher-ranking officer).  If the 
officer has sufficient discretion, a biased evaluation in the second activity would lead the officer 
to alter the allocation of her time.  Presumably, a positive bias would cause the officer to spend 
more time investigating crimes, and vice versa.  Such bias-induced shifts in behavior further 
complicate the identification problem in assessing the impact of discrimination in labor markets.       
This study addresses both of these issues, using detailed data on the evaluation, observed 
strategies and performances of Major League Baseball (MLB) players.  Our focus is on 
racial/ethnic bias, specifically between the umpire (evaluator) and the pitcher (worker), although 
the arguments we develop apply to any type of subjective bias.1  We pay particular attention to 
                                                 
1Pitches are only subject to the umpire’s discretion (are “called”) when the batter does not swing, rendering 
necessary a judgment of whether the pitch was a “ball” or a “strike.”   
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the race/ethnicity “match” of the umpire and pitcher, which occurs when, for example, a Black 
umpire evaluates a Black pitcher, as opposed to evaluating a White or Hispanic pitcher.  
Our first observation is that pitchers who match the race/ethnicity of the home-plate 
umpire appear to receive slightly favorable treatment, as indicated by a higher probability that a 
pitch is called a strike, compared to players who do not match.  Although this confers an 
advantage to some players at the expense of others, the effect we document here is small, on 
average affecting less than a pitch per game.  Much more interesting are situations when and 
where the effects are strongest.  Roughly one-third of the ballparks we study contain a system of 
computerized cameras (QuesTec) used to evaluate the umpires, comparing their ball/strike calls 
to a less subjective standard.  Umpires have strong incentives to suppress any bias in such 
situations, as the QuesTec evaluations are important for their own career outcomes.  With such 
explicit monitoring, evidence of any race or ethnicity preference vanishes entirely.   
We find similar effects with implicit monitoring; when a game is well attended (and 
presumably more closely scrutinized), or when the pitch is pivotal for an at-bat, race/ethnicity 
matching again plays no role in the umpire’s evaluation.  In situations where the umpire is 
neither explicitly nor implicitly monitored, the effect of the bias is considerable.  As an example, 
a Hispanic pitcher facing a Hispanic umpire in a low-scrutiny setting (e.g., no cameras, poorly 
attended) receives strikes on 32.5 percent of called pitches, which drops to 30.0 percent if a 
Black umpire is behind the plate.  
However, such direct effects are magnified when pitchers adjust their strategies in 
response to biased evaluations. Like the multi-tasking police officer mentioned above, a pitcher 
can alter his behavior to make himself either more immune, or more exposed to, the umpire’s 
judgment.  Specifically, pitches thrown near the borders of the strike zone (e.g., over one of 
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home plate’s corners) are called balls nearly as frequently as they are called strikes.  They 
constitute a “fuzzy” region where the umpire can employ maximum subjectivity.  Because such 
pitches are more difficult for batters to hit than those thrown directly into the strike zone, we 
would expect pitchers aware of favorable treatment to throw disproportionately to this fuzzy 
region.  We find exactly this.  Pitchers who match the umpire’s race/ethnicity attempt to “paint 
the corners,” throwing pitches allowing umpires the most discretion.  This tendency is much 
stronger in low-scrutiny situations, when umpires face a lower cost of indulging their 
preferences. 
At the end of both exercises, we are left with two specific conclusions.  First, incentives 
matter.  Unless provided strong incentives not to do so, umpires appear to allow the pitcher’s 
race or ethnicity to influence their subjective judgments.  This leads to a small, but non-trivial, 
direct effect on the game, simply by increasing the probability that a pitch is called a strike.  
Second, pitchers appear to understand these incentive effects, and take measures to protect 
themselves by avoiding situations requiring high subjectivity when facing a downward bias. 
The results also lead to two general conclusions.  First, these results show that when 
worker productivity is measured subjectively, and when such measurements are biased by 
discrimination, the usual tests for discrimination are biased toward finding nothing.  We illustrate 
the size of this bias in our sample of baseball pitchers.  Second, they illustrate the need to be 
aware of the manner in which discrimination in one facet of evaluation can lead market 
participants to alter their behavior in other dimensions.       
 Baseball offers several advantages when studying discrimination.  First, because every 
pitch is potentially subject to the home-plate umpire’s discretion when it is thrown (several 
hundred times per game), there is sufficient scope for racial/ethnic discrimination to be expressed 
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as well as for it to affect games’ outcomes significantly.  In addition, the very large number of 
independent pitch-level observations involving the interaction of different races/ethnicities 
allows us not only to explore umpires’ preference for players of their own race/ethnicity, but also 
to examine preferences toward other races/ethnicities.2   An additional feature of baseball data is 
that, unlike other sports where a group dynamic among officials may alter the expression of 
individual biases, the home-plate umpire is exclusively responsible for calling every pitch in a 
typical baseball game.3  
The most fortunate aspect of the data set is that it allows us to develop several 
independent proxies for the scrutiny of the umpire’s decisions, and in so doing, to test for the 
existence of price-sensitive discrimination by umpires.  The time period that we analyze, 2004-
2008, is special, because only during this time were a portion of the ballparks outfitted with 
computers and cameras to monitor umpires’ balls and strikes calls.  Because umpires are 
randomly assigned to venues, observing differences in their behavior between parks with and 
without monitoring technology makes a convincing case that properly placed incentives can have 
the desired effect.  These results allow us not only to describe how biases can influence 
subjective performance valuations, but also to offer prescriptive suggestions to minimize their 
impact. 
Several studies (e.g., Luis Garicano et al, 2005; Eric W. Zitzewitz, 2006, and Thomas J. 
Dohmen, 2008) have examined home-team preferences by referees/judges in various sports, and 
another, Michael A. Stoll et al (2004) examines racial match preferences in employment 
                                                 
2The data also include a small number of Asian pitchers, but because there are no Asian umpires, we exclude them 
in our analysis.  Given their trivial numbers however, their inclusion gives nearly identical results in every instance. 
 
3Umpires can be positioned behind home plate or at first, second or third base. The home-plate umpire occasionally 
appeals to either the first- or third-base umpire, but this is a relatively infrequent occurrence, and in any case is 
usually initiated by the home-plate umpire himself to help determine if the batter swung at the ball.   
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generally.  Our study most closely resembles Joseph Price and Justin J. Wolfers’ (2007) work on 
NBA officiating crews’ racial preferences.  Although the first part of our empirical analysis 
corroborates their findings (but for a different sport), we are mainly interested in when or where 
racial/ethnic bias is most likely to be observed.  Here, we offer two insights.  First, we show that 
discrimination is price-sensitive, so that making it more costly reduces its expression.  Second, 
we show that, when quantifying how players are affected by biased performance evaluations, the 
direct effect is only part of the story.  Because players will alter their strategies in response, even 
situations that are seemingly insulated from a biased evaluator (e.g., non-called pitches in 
baseball games) are affected. 
This research adds to a large literature on racial discrimination in sports, specifically in 
baseball, going back at least to Anthony H. Pascal and Leonard A. Rapping (1972), James D. 
Gwartney and Charles T. Haworth (1974) and Gerald W. Scully (1974), and recently J.C. 
Bradbury (2007) generally, with others dealing with particular racial/ethnic issues (Clark 
Nardinelli and Curtis J. Simon, 1990, David W. Findlay and Clifford E. Reid, 1997, and Rodney 
D. Fort and Andrew M. Gill, 2000). It includes studies of such outcomes as productivity, wages, 
customers’ approbation of players, selection for honors, and others.  There is some evidence of 
wage disparities among baseball players of different races, but the results are mixed, e.g., 
Lawrence M. Kahn (1991). The conclusions of racial discrimination (or lack thereof) in this 
literature depend upon each player’s productivity being accurately measured, as measured 
productivity is typically the crucial control variable.  We suggest questioning this central 
assumption: If officials’ judgments are themselves subject to racial/ethnic bias, adjusting for 
differences in the returns to measured productivity will not enable us to obtain proper measures 
of the extent of discrimination.          
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The results allow us to think about the deeper question of measuring discrimination 
generally.  If, as we show here, the match to the race/ethnicity of their evaluator affects 
evaluations of workers, then the measured productivity of the worker will depend on the nature 
of that match.  This difficulty has serious implications for measuring discrimination and is 
another manifestation of the difficulty of identifying discrimination pointed out by Stephen G. 
Donald and Daniel S. Hamermesh (2006). 
 In the next section we describe the pitch- and game-level data and explain our 
classification of umpires’ and players’ races/ethnicities.  We analyze individual pitches in 
Section III, and in Section IV we show that umpires express these preferences strongly only in 
times of low scrutiny.  We examine the indirect impact of discrimination on pitchers’ strategies 
in Section V.  Section VI shows the overall effects on pitchers’ performances and derives the 
size of the effects of biased performance evaluation on the measurement of wage discrimination 
generally and for the example of pitchers’ salaries.  
 
II. Data  
Pitches.  There are 30 teams in Major League Baseball, with each team playing 162 
games in each regular season.  During a typical game each team’s pitchers throw about 150 
pitches, so that approximately 700,000 pitches are thrown each season. We collect pitch-by-pitch 
data from ESPN.com for every regular-season MLB game from 2004-2008.4  Our final dataset 
consists of 3,524,624 total pitches.  For each pitch we identify the pitcher, pitcher’s team, batter, 
                                                 
4The pitch-by-pitch information is from:  
 http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/playbyplay?gameId=NNNNNNNN&full=1, where NNNNNNNNN  
represents the nine-digit game ID. The first six digits correspond to the year, month and date of the game.  The box 




batter’s team, catcher, pitch count, score, inning, and pitch outcome.  We classify each pitch into 
one of seven exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories:  Called strike, called ball, swinging 
strike, foul, hit into play, intentional ball or hit by pitch. We supplement each pitch observation 
with other relevant information, including the stadium name, home team, away team, and the 
identities and positions of all four umpires.  
Player and Umpire Race/Ethnicity.  We next classify each position player, pitcher and 
umpire who appears in our dataset as White, Hispanic, Black or Asian. To begin this task, we 
collect country of birth for every player and umpire. Players or umpires are classified as Hispanic 
if they were born in: Colombia, Cuba, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Puerto Rico or Venezuela. Players from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are classified 
as Asian. We classify an additional 69 players using an AOL Sports article which lists every 
African-American player on a MLB roster at the beginning of the 2007 season.5  We also utilize 
a similar list of past and present Hispanic players in MLB from Answers.com.6 All remaining 
unclassified players and umpires are classified by visual inspection of pictures found in Internet 
searches.7 Three of the race/ethnic groups are represented among umpires (there are no Asian 
umpires in MLB), and all four are represented among pitchers.   
Table 1 presents the distributions of the pitch outcomes. The first row of the table 
summarizes all pitches, while subsequent rows sub-divide pitches based on the race/ethnicity of 
                                                 
5The complete list can be found at http://Blackvoices.aol.com/Black_sports/special/_a/african-american-players-in-
mlb/20070413095009990001. 
 
6The complete list can be found at http://www.answers.com/topic/list-of-hispanic-players-in-major-league-baseball. 
 
7For a few umpires, no pictures were available on the internet. For each of them we watched past games in which the 
umpires worked to ascertain their race/ethnicity.  Any such classification is necessarily ambiguous in a number of 
cases.  To the extent that we have inadvertently classified pitchers, umpires, or batters in ways different from how 
they might be treated on the field, this will introduce measurement error into the matches and thus reduce the 
strength of any results that we generate. 
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the pitcher, the batter and the home plate umpire, respectively. Approximately 46 percent of 
pitches elicit a swing from the batter, hit the batter, or are intentionally thrown out of the strike 
zone.  Our pitch-level analysis focuses on the 54 percent of pitches (1.89 million) that result in 
called strikes or balls, since these alone are subject to evaluation by the home-plate umpire. Of 
these, about 32 percent are called strikes, and the rest are called balls.   
The table also reports the number of pitchers, batters and home-plate umpires in each of 
the four race/ethnicity categories. The percentages of White pitchers (70 percent) and batters (61 
percent) are lower in our sample than the percentage of White umpires (89 percent).  On the 
other hand, Hispanics, comprising 23 percent of pitchers and 26 percent of batters, are under-
represented among umpires (only 5 percent). Black pitchers, batters and umpires comprise 3 
percent, 10 percent, and 6 percent of the samples, respectively. Asian players comprise 3 percent 
of pitchers and 2 percent of batters. 
Pitch Location.  For approximately one-third of the games played in 2007 season and all 
of those played in 2008, we collected from PITCHf/x several additional variables.  PITCHf/x, a 
computerized technology owned by Sportvision, uses two cameras to record the path of a pitch 
from the pitcher's hand to home plate.8  The parameters measured and calculated using this 
technology include: 1) the pitch type, determined using MLB's proprietary neural net 
classification algorithm, 2) the estimated pitch location when it crosses the home plate relative to 
the center of the front of the home plate, and 3) the top and bottom of the strike zone as 
determined by the PITCHf/x operator.9   
                                                 
8The information is provided by the MLB free of charge at: http://gd2.mlb.com/components/game/mlb/. 
 
9The operator sets a horizontal line at each batter’s belt as he settles into the hitting position, and the PITCHf/x 
software adds four inches up to define the top of the zone.  For the bottom of the zone, the PITCHf/x operator sets a 
horizontal line at the hollow of each batter’s knee.  More information on PITCHf/x's parameters can be found at: 
http://fastballs.wordpress.com/category/pitchfx-glossary/  and  
http://webusers.npl.illinois.edu/~a-nathan/pob/tracking.htm. 
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Pitcher Performance. For each starting pitcher’s appearance in each game, we collect 
from box scores the number of innings pitched, the numbers of hits, runs and home runs allowed, 
walks, strikeouts, and earned runs (downloaded from the ESPN website). We also obtain the 
final score of the game to identify the winning and losing teams.  
 
III. Called Pitches and Umpire-Pitcher Matches 
Table 2 reports for each pitcher/umpire racial/ethnic combination the number of pitches 
thrown, the number of called pitches, the number of called strikes and the percentage of called 
pitches that are strikes. About two-thirds of the called pitches in our sample occur when the 
umpire and pitcher share the same race/ethnicity (mostly White pitcher/White home-plate 
umpire). While the percentage of pitches that are called is similar in situations where the 
umpire’s and pitcher’s race/ethnicity match and in situations where they do not (53.7 percent), a 
central difference is that the percentage of called pitches that are strikes is higher when they 
match (32.0 percent) than when they do not (31.5 percent).  
The summary statistics in Table 2 ignore possible differences inherent in the quality or 
“style” of pitchers by race/ethnicity. They also ignore the possibly different outcomes generated 
by non-random assignment of pitchers to face different opponents, and of umpires to games 
played by particular teams.10  To account for these and other potential difficulties, our central test 
for umpires’ discrimination in calling strikes is the specification:  
   I(Strike│Called Pitch)i = γ0 + γ1UPMi + γ2Controlsi + εi,                             (1) 
                                                 
10Examination of umpires’ schedules indicates that, while umpires typically travel as a four-person crew throughout 
much of the year, crews are randomly assigned across teams, ballparks, geography, and league (American or 
National).  Furthermore, umpires rotate in a specific order, i.e., each serves as the home-plate umpire exactly every 
fourth game, resulting in random assignment of umpires to starting pitchers. 
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where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether a called pitch is a strike, the γ are 
parameters, ε is a well-behaved error term, and i indexes pitches.  The main explanatory variable 
of interest is UPM, an indicator of whether the umpire (U) and pitcher (P) match (M) on 
race/ethnicity.  In almost all of our tests, we include fixed effects for each pitcher, umpire and 
batter so that UPM picks up the marginal effect of a racial/ethnic match between the home-plate 
umpire and pitcher.  That is, because any player or race-specific effects are swept out by the 
fixed effects, umpires’ bias is identified purely via the interaction term, UPM.   
In addition to these, we employ a number of control variables.  Pitch-count indicators, 
which record how many balls and strikes have accrued during a particular at-bat, are crucial 
because pitchers alter the location of their pitches based on the ball-strike count. Inning 
indicators are also included, because pitchers are usually less fatigued early in games, and 
because a “relief” pitcher often replaces a pitcher who starts the game in later innings, with a 
different (often reduced) accuracy.11  Home-field bias is captured by top-of-the-inning indicators, 
which account for which team is pitching.  Lastly, we include the pitcher’s score advantage 
(defined as the number of runs, potentially negative, by which the pitcher’s team is ahead).   
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equations where the pitcher’s and umpire’s 
race/ethnicity are allowed to influence the likelihood of a called strike.  All the estimates are 
based on linear-probability models (but probit estimates present the same picture) with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  The first three columns show specifications separately 
for White, Black and Hispanic pitchers, respectively, controlling for umpire race/ethnicity and 
pitcher fixed effects. The next three columns show separate equations for White, Black and 
Hispanic umpires, respectively, controlling for pitcher race/ethnicity and umpire fixed effects. 
                                                 
11With pitcher fixed effects, this second reason for inning indicators is obviously subsumed. 
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The final three columns include all pitchers and umpires, with each column adding successive 
vectors of fixed effects, including in the final column pitchers, umpires and batters.  
There is some, albeit weak, evidence of favoritism by umpires for pitchers who match 
their race/ethnicity.  For example, Column (1) shows that Hispanic umpires judge White pitchers 
more harshly than do White umpires (the omitted indicator variable), but that they judge 
Hispanic pitchers more favorably (Column (3)). Similarly, Column (4) shows that White 
umpires, the overwhelming majority, judge minority pitchers more harshly than they judge 
White pitchers.   Taking the results in Column (9) with the full sets of control variables and fixed 
effects as the best description of the underlying behavior, however, it is quite clear that there is 
no generally significant impact of the match on umpire evaluations (p=.34).  
Although the results with the broadest sets of fixed effects do not suggest a significant 
effect of the umpire-pitcher match, the point estimate implies that a given called pitch is 
approximately 0.16 percentage points more likely to be a strike if the umpire and pitcher match 
race/ethnicity. The likelihood that a given called pitch is called a strike is 31.9 percent.  Thus 
when the umpire matches the pitcher’s race/ethnicity, the rate of called strikes rises by one-half 
percent above the rate when there is no match.12 
 
IV. Biased Evaluation When Bias Is Costly  
 One might examine the results in Table 3 and conclude that, while the point estimates are 
interesting, their statistical insignificance means that there is very little here.  Given an 
economist’s view that agents acting out their preferences will react to the price of an activity, 
however, it is worthwhile examining the impacts of umpire-pitcher matches as the price of 
                                                 
12As a check on this issue we re-estimated the model including sequentially the race/ethnic match between the first-, 
second- and third-base umpire and the pitcher.  None of these extensions materially changes our conclusions.  
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discrimination changes. We begin by asking what factors affect the price of expressing racial or 
ethnic discrimination.  Studies of cognitive behavior indicate that presenting the biased party 
with counter-examples of the stereotype of interest can reduce the severity and/or frequency of 
the biased behavior (Stephanie A. Goodwin et al, 2000; Irene V. Blair, 2002).  In other words, 
simply making conscious a sub-conscious bias imposes a sufficient psychological cost to 
mitigate its expression.  Another mechanism is to increase the visibility of the biased party’s 
behavior, potentially exposing the offender to social or legal penalties.  Here we proxy the price 
of discrimination by the extent to which an umpire’s evaluations of pitchers will be scrutinized. 
We employ three different measures to examine whether a higher price of discrimination reduces 
the extent to which umpires engage in discriminatory behavior. 
The first source of scrutiny is QuesTec, a computerized monitoring system intended to 
evaluate the accuracy and consistency of home-plate umpires’ judgments.  From 2004-2008, 
MLB had installed QuesTec in 11 of its 30 ballparks.13  QuesTec’s Umpire Information System 
(UIS) consists of four cameras that track and record the location of each pitch, providing 
information about the accuracy and precision of each umpire’s ball and strike calls.  Despite 
opposition from some umpires and players (perhaps most memorably, pitcher Curt Schilling’s 
assault on a camera after a poor outing), the QuesTec system served as an important tool to 
evaluate umpires during our sample period.  According to the umpires’ union’s agreement with 
MLB, QuesTec is the primary mechanism to gauge umpire performance.  If more than 10 
percent of an umpire’s calls differ from QuesTec’s records, his performance is considered 
                                                 
13The ballparks of the Anaheim Angels, Arizona Diamondbacks, Boston Red Sox, Cleveland Indians, Oakland 
Athletics, Milwaukee Brewers, Houston Astros, New York Mets, Tampa Bay Devil Rays, Chicago White Sox, and 
New York Yankees.  
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substandard, which can influence his promotion to “crew chief,” assignment to post-season 
games, or even retention in MLB.14 
Because QuesTec is installed in roughly one-third of ballparks, and because umpiring 
crews are rotated randomly around the league’s ballparks, virtually every umpire in our data set 
calls a substantial number of pitches in parks with and without QuesTec.15  Additionally, both 
the umpires’ and teams’ schedules change every year, exposing each umpire to a wide cross-
section of batters and pitchers in both types of parks.  Throughout the analysis we test whether 
greater scrutiny—the possibly higher cost of bias in subjective evaluation of pitches in QuesTec 
parks—leads umpires to call strikes “by the book.”  Any role that racial/ethnic (or any other) 
preferences play in influencing pitch calls should be mitigated if costs of being judged 
substandard are imposed, as through QuesTec.  Some pitchers may, however, react differently 
from others in response to QuesTec.16  For that reason, in all of the estimates in this part (and 
hereafter) we include fixed effects not only for each pitcher, umpire and batter, but also for the 
presence or absence of QuesTec in each game, i.e., pitcher-QuesTec fixed effects, umpire-
QuesTec fixed effects, and batter-umpire-QuesTec fixed effects. 
Figure 1 graphs the average percentages of called pitches that are strikes in ballparks with 
and without QuesTec, for White and minority pitchers respectively.  The effect of monitoring on 
umpires’ behavior is apparent, with both White and minority pitchers being judged differently by 
                                                 
14An umpire’s evaluation is not based solely on QuesTec.  If an umpire falls below the QuesTec standards, his 
performance is then reviewed by videotape and live observation by other umpires to determine his final evaluation 
score.  No such measures are taken, however, if an umpire meets the QuesTec standards. 
     
15The fraction of games in which QuesTec was installed was virtually identical for all umpires in our sample, 
differing for the few umpires calling only a handful of games. 
 
16For example, New York Mets pitcher Tom Glavine, known as a “finesse” pitcher who depends on pitches close to 
the strike zone border, complained publicly that QuesTec’s influence on umpire calls forced him to change his style 
(Associated Press, July 9, 2003). Glavine reports that he was told, “[umpires do] not call pitches on the corners at 
Shea [his home ballpark] because they [the umpires] don't want the machine to give them poor grades.”   
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umpires of the matched race/ethnicity, depending on whether the pitch is thrown in a park with 
QuesTec installed.  The difference in the called-strike percentage between QuesTec and non-
QuesTec parks is significant for both White and minority pitchers.  
Table 4 contains the results of estimating (1) separately for QuesTec and non-QuesTec 
parks, with controls for inning, pitch count, pitcher score advantage, and top of the inning.17  The 
results are striking:  In ballparks with the UIS, shown in Column (1), the coefficient on UPM   is 
-0.48 percentage points and is not significantly different from zero. In parks without QuesTec, 
shown in Column (2), the same coefficient is 0.59 percentage points per pitch (p=.007).  These 
differences make clear why UPM is not significant in the aggregate sample.  The effects found in 
Table 3 averaged the statistically significant positive impact of an unscrutinized match (non-
QuesTec) with a statistically insignificant negative impact of a scrutinized match (QuesTec) that 
is nearly as large.  Thus, in the presence of price-sensitive discrimination, we should expect the 
point estimates in Table 3 to be low, since the entire sample consists of a mix of high- and low-
scrutiny games. Specifically, QuesTec covers about 37 percent of pitches, so that the average 
result from Table 3 is easily reconciled: (.37)(-.48)+(.63)(.59)=.19, close to the 0.16 estimate 
obtained with a comparable set of fixed effects.      
Column (3) of Table 4 presents the results when the QuesTec indicator is interacted with 
UPM.  When the pitcher and umpire match race/ethnicity, pitching in a QuesTec park reduces 
the likelihood that a called pitch is ruled a strike by over 1 percentage point, more than offsetting 
the favoritism shown by umpires when QuesTec does not monitor them.  Each effect is highly 
significant, implying that umpires implicitly allow their apparent preference for matched pitchers 
to be expressed when the pitches underlying their decisions are not recorded.  
                                                 
17The direct effect of being in a QuesTec park is, of course, not directly observable, being subsumed in the pitcher-
QuesTec fixed effects. 
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QuesTec is an explicit monitoring technology. Implicit monitoring can have similar 
effects, suggesting that even subtle incentive mechanisms can have desirable effects on 
otherwise discriminatory outcomes.  The two measures for implicit scrutiny of umpires are 
crowd attendance (scaled by stadium capacity) and the “importance” of the pitch.18   
The idea for the first is simple.  Having many fans close to home plate presumably 
exposes the umpire to their scrutiny—a badly called pitch is unlikely to go unnoticed.19  Figure 2 
confirms that crowd attendance, like QuesTec, dramatically alters umpire behavior.  A game is 
defined as “well-attended” if the crowd attendance is above the median percentage capacity in 
this sample, roughly 70 percent.  Compared to well-attended games, umpires calling poorly-
attended games appear to favor pitchers of matched race/ethnicity.  In the case of White pitchers, 
both minority and White umpires tend to call fewer strikes in poorly-attended games, but the 
reduction in strikes called by minority umpires is over three times larger.  The same effect is seen 
to an even greater degree among minority pitchers.  During well-attended games, matching 
minority umpires call about 0.8 percent fewer strikes. They call 0.7 percent more strikes in 
poorly attended ones, a net effect over 1.5 percentage points.   
In Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A in Table 5, we show the results of estimating (1) 
separately for well- and poorly-attended games respectively. Each equation includes the same 
battery of controls as in Table 4, i.e., pitcher, umpire and batter fixed effects, pitch counts, and 
inning indicators. As with the QuesTec results, the UPM variable is significant (p=.008) only in 
                                                 
18We scale by stadium capacity to minimize the impact of differences between stadium sizes.  If we assume that 
stadiums populate relatively uniformly, attendance/capacity is a good proxy for the number of fans close enough to 
judge pitch location.  In any case, this scaling makes little difference in our results.  If instead we use attendance, all 
coefficients of interest remain highly significant.   
 
19Percentage attendance may also proxy the popularity of the participating teams or the importance of a particular 
game. Thus, not only might the umpire be exposed to more scrutiny from the additional fans present at well-attended 
games, but he may also face added scrutiny in the form of larger television audiences and increased air-time given to 
game highlights.   
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poorly-attended games, with an effect of 0.64 percentage points per pitch.  During well-attended 
games there is no significant effect of an umpire-pitcher racial/ethnic match and, as before, the 
point estimate is negative.  Column (3) generalizes the results by aggregating all games and 
interacting UPM with the indicator for a game being well attended.  Compared to a pitch in a 
poorly-attended game when the umpire and pitcher do not match, a pitch called by an umpire of 
the same race/ethnicity as the pitcher is 0.36 percentage points more likely to be judged a strike. 
If the game is well-attended, a pitch is no more likely to be called a strike if the pitcher and 
umpire match race/ethnicity.  The results for this completely different proxy for the price of 
discrimination are qualitatively identical to those obtained for the QuesTec/non-QuesTec 
distinction. 
A third proxy for the scrutiny of umpires varies many times within each game.  We 
separate pitches into two categories, “terminal” and “non-terminal.”  A pitch is potentially 
terminal if the umpire’s next judgment can terminate the batter’s plate appearance.  Specifically, 
a pitch that is thrown with two strikes and/or three balls is potentially terminal, as a third strike 
or fourth ball terminates the at-bat.  In such situations, the umpire’s judgment is likely to be 
scrutinized more heavily by the pitcher, batter, catcher, managers and fans.  An initial glimpse 
into the effects of this distinction is shown in Figure 3.  Here we observe the same contrast as for 
the previous two proxies for scrutiny, as umpires appear to favor pitchers with whom they match 
only in non-terminal counts, when scrutiny is likely to be reduced.  
Columns (4) and (5) of Panel B of Table 5 show estimates of (1) separately for terminal 
and non-terminal pitches, with pitcher, umpire and batter fixed effects and the usual set of 
control variables.  We consider pitches of differing importance separately, with the result that the 
coefficients of UPM have opposite signs.  For pitches that cannot be terminal, the estimated 
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coefficient of UPM is 0.31 percentage points (p=.15)—umpires favor pitchers who match their 
own race/ethnicity.  For potentially terminal pitches, where scrutiny of the umpire is likely to be 
greater, umpires appear to judge pitchers of their own race/ethnicity (insignificantly) more 
harshly than unmatched pitchers. In Column (6) all pitches are aggregated, and UPM is 
interacted with an indicator for potentially terminal pitches.  The results mimic those implicit in 
the estimates in Columns (4) and (5), as the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and 
significant at better than the 1 percent level. 
In Columns (7) and (8) we consider another source of within-game variation in implicit 
scrutiny.  We assume that, because umpires’ evaluations are more likely to be pivotal late in 
games, scrutiny in the first few innings is likely to be comparatively less.  We thus designate the 
first third (three innings) of a game as “early,” and the remainder “late.”  We expect that a 
terminal count will have a stronger effect on the outcome of a pitcher-umpire racial/ethnic match 
in early innings.  Comparing the results across the two columns, we see that this is the case, with 
the magnitude of the interaction between terminal count and UPM being over twice as large in 
early as in late innings (-0.86 vs. -0.38 percentage points). 
Our proxies for scrutiny are not redundant.  The correlation between QuesTec and 
attendance percentage is small, and because the type of pitch (terminal or non-terminal) is a 
within-game measure, it is necessarily uncorrelated with either between-game measure.  It is 
therefore not surprising that, when all three interactions are included simultaneously in Panel C, 
everything remains significant with nearly identical magnitudes as in Panels A and B.  
Before proceeding to issues of robustness, we briefly address whether the UPM effect is 
due to positive bias for pitchers who match the umpire’s race/ethnicity (i.e., favoritism), or to 
negative bias against those who do not match.  Answering this question in our context is 
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difficult, because ball and strike calls are inherently subjective.  (Compare this to tennis, where 
the definition of a shot being “in” or “out” is completely objective, allowing, for example, 
computerized instant replay to reverse the judge’s calls.)  Absent an objective standard on strike 
calls, we cannot precisely quantify the bias’ direction; but comparing umpires’ behavior between 
QuesTec and non-QuesTec ballparks provides some illumination. 
If one accepts the premise that umpires exercise special care in QuesTec parks, the strike 
percentage there, although not perfect, is closer to the desired benchmark of objectivity that 
would permit the desired calculation.  For each of the nine possible race/ethnic combinations, we 
compare the called strike percentage in QuesTec parks (the quasi-objective benchmark) to that in 
non-QuesTec parks.  First, all three cases of a match (e.g., White-White) show a higher called 
strike percentage in non-QuesTec parks, which suggests favoritism in less scrutinized situations.  
Second, five of the six cases of non-match show a lower called strike percentage in non-QuesTec 
parks, which suggests negative bias.  Such a two-sided pattern not only justifies the use of an 
aggregate UPM variable in Tables 3-5; it also demonstrates that the effect is symmetric and 
pervasive across nearly every possible combination.  However, we do not focus further on the 
positive/ negative bias distinction, because baseball – and indeed all games with winners and 
losers – is a zero-sum game. It is relative treatment that matters most, just as in labor markets 
generally it is disparate treatment, not the difficult-to-identify distinction between the absence of 
favoritism and the presence of negative bias, that underlies so much case law.  
Other matches.  An umpire influenced by the race of the pitcher may also be influenced 
by that of the batter or the catcher, especially because in the latter case, the umpire is in 
continuing close contact.  We find little evidence to support this argument.  In the same types of 
regressions as in Tables 3-5, but with new matching variables, there is some very weak evidence 
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that batters receive the type of preferential treatment experienced by pitchers.  But the 
magnitudes and statistical significance are much smaller in every case.  Reliable evidence for 
similar catcher-umpire dynamics is even weaker.  Umpires appear focused on the pitchers they 
are judging.  Their matches with other relevant players do not affect their judgments.  
 Post-season. The three scrutiny proxies we employ have the advantage of splitting the 
sample of called pitches into two large groups, generating the statistical power required to detect 
subtle differences in called strike probabilities.  There are many additional cross-sectional tests 
one could perform, e.g., comparing playoff to regular season games (because the former are 
likely to be particularly scrutinized), but such thin cross-sectional comparisons contain almost no 
power.  For example, we replicate the analysis in Panel C of Table 5, aggregating playoff and 
regular season games, and including interaction terms for post-season pitches with the 
coefficients of interest (unreported).  There is only the weakest of evidence that playoff 
situations reduce further the expression of umpire bias (the interaction of post-season with UPM 
is negative, as expected, but the p-value is 0.74).  We encounter a similar problem when, for 
example, examining particularly “important” games, such as those pivotal for playoff races late 
in the season.  
 Umpire and City Characteristics.  It may be that umpires’ measurable characteristics 
(beyond their race/ethnicity) and those of the city where a game is played explain our results.  
We collected demographic information on each umpire from a variety of sources and include his 
age and experience, and in many cases both his state of birth and residence. For each ballpark we 
also obtain the racial/ethnic breakdown of the surrounding metropolitan statistical area. 
We find no evidence that the racial composition of an umpire’s birthplace or residence 
predicts his propensity to penalize non-matching players, but there is some weak evidence that 
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bias is more likely among younger and less experienced umpires.  The coefficient on UPM in a 
re-specification of (1) among the upper half of umpires ranked by experience is less than half its 
magnitude in estimates for umpires in the lower half of the distribution.  If (1) is re-estimated 
separately for the 18 “crew chiefs,” veterans selected for their seniority and performance, the 
point estimate of the coefficient on UPM is nearly zero.  This evidence is consistent with models 
of selection or learning.  Perhaps discriminating umpires are not promoted and are dropped from 
the ranks.  Alternatively, experience may teach umpires to restrain their own biases. 
We also re-estimated the basic equation for Blacks, and for Hispanics, separately, adding 
in each case main effects and interactions with UPM of the percentage of the minority group in 
the metropolitan area where the ballpark is located.  Among Blacks the interaction was positive, 
but statistically insignificant; among Hispanics it was negative, and also statistically 
insignificant.  Our conclusions are not affected by the racial/ethnic mix of the team’s catchment 
area. 20 
 Gaming the System.  Perhaps managers are implicitly both aware of these preferences and 
able to act upon them.  Because the majority of umpires are White, there is a distinct advantage 
for a team with one or more minority pitchers (particularly starting pitchers) to have QuesTec in 
its home park.  We found no information about the how teams were awarded QuesTec in their 
home parks, or whether they could influence this choice.  A second possibility is that teams 
                                                 
20The overwhelming majority of minority pitchers are Hispanic. We have aggregated them, but some are White 
Hispanics, while others are Black Hispanics. To allow for the possibility that the two different groups of minority 
umpires might treat Hispanic pitchers who match their own characteristics differently from other Hispanic pitchers, 
we visually inspected the pitchers’ pictures, divided the Hispanic aggregate into White and Black groups, and 
consequently re-defined UPM.  This reclassification had almost no effect on the estimates produced in Tables 3-5.  
Implicitly, Hispanic and other umpires treat Hispanic pitchers the same regardless of the pitcher’s racial identity. We 
also investigated whether American-born Hispanic pitchers were treated differently from Hispanic pitchers born 




receiving QuesTec systems traded for minority pitchers from teams whose parks were not 
similarly equipped.   
Although we have no direct evidence, some simple calculations suggest that either 
possibility may have merit.  For visiting pitchers, the percentage of pitches thrown in QuesTec 
parks is nearly identical for Whites and minorities (37.4 and 37.9 respectively).  This is to be 
expected, because on average, teams play approximately the same fraction of opponents whose 
home stadiums contain QuesTec.  Thus, there is no evidence that visiting managers adjust their 
pitching lineups to minimize the exposure of their minority pitchers to the subjective bias of a 
White umpire.   
 Home pitchers tell a different story.  Minority home pitchers throw 39.2 percent of their 
pitches in QuesTec parks, compared to only 35.5 percent for White pitchers.  Home minority 
pitchers are more likely to be in QuesTec environments, which can only be the case if their home 
ballpark has QuesTec.  This is consistent with either initial non-random assignment of QuesTec 
to teams with a disproportionate number of minority pitchers, with transactions that increase the 
fraction of minority pitchers for teams already equipped with QuesTec, or with game-time lineup 
juggling by home teams.  Although we cannot distinguish among these alternatives, this 
evidence is interesting by suggesting that biased evaluations in one area (e.g., called strikes) may 
have unintended consequences in other arenas (e.g., the allocation of Minority pitching talent).  
Note that none of these possibilities alters the significance or interpretation of the previous 
results, as all regressions control for player ability, umpire tendencies, and the presence or 
absence of QuesTec. 
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V. The Effects of Biased Evaluations on Agents’ Strategies  
The pitch-level evidence makes very clear that direct effects on pitch outcomes are small. 
Of course, one can construct specific examples where the estimated direct effect is fairly large: a 
Black pitcher throwing a non-terminal pitch in the early innings of poorly-attended games in a 
non-QuesTec ballpark gains over 6 percentage points by matching (41.4 vs. 35.2 percent called 
strikes).  But in most situations, the direct impact on called pitches is not large.  
Indirect effects on players’ strategies may, however, have larger impacts on the outcomes 
of plate appearances and games.  The dynamic between a pitcher and batter is clearly affected by 
each party’s beliefs about the umpire’s evaluation in the event of a called pitch.  If a pitcher 
expects favoritism, he will incorporate this advantage into his strategy, perhaps throwing pitches 
that allow the umpire more discretion.  This in turn may change the batter’s optimal behavior.  If 
the batter expects such pitches to be called strikes, he is forced to swing at “worse” pitches, 
which reduces the likelihood of getting a hit.21 
To appreciate more fully such induced changes in strategy, for all the starting pitchers for 
whom such data are available (over 500,000 pitches), we augment the pitch-level data with the 
data set on pitch characteristics.22  This level of detail allows addressing the extent to which 
pitchers alter their strategies (e.g., location and type of pitch), when facing a biased subjective 
evaluation.  Panel A of Table 6 summarizes the two location variables of interest: 1) the 
horizontal pitch distance, and 2) the pitch height.  The first is the distance (in feet) from the 
                                                 
21Examining the coefficients on the count indicators in Table 3 illustrates the intuition.  When the pitcher has a 
substantial advantage in the count, he has little incentive to throw a “hittable” pitch, i.e., one near the middle of the 
plate.  Instead, he usually throws pitches near the corners that are both less likely to be hit if the batter swings, and 
less likely to be called strikes if the batter does not.  Such behavior translates into sizeable advantages for pitchers 
depending on the count.  In 2004, batters got a hit 33 percent of the time when the count was 2-1 (two balls and one 
strike), but dropped to less than 18 percent when the count was 1-2.  
    
22The number of pitches differs slightly across the panels because of difficulties in classifying by location and type. 
Jowei Chen (2007) used these data for a single season as controls to examine racial bias in MLB umpires’ calls.   
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center of home plate. (The slightly negative mean value for this variable reflects the tendency to 
avoid hitting or pitching inside to batters, and most batters are right-handed.)  The second is 
calculated as the pitch’s vertical distance from the center of the strike zone, which is set by the 
computer operator to be between the batter’s waist and knee (typically 2.5 feet above the 
ground).  That this region varies among batters is not a problem, as all of the analyses we present 
include batter fixed effects. 
Pitches in certain locations are almost always called one way or the other.  This is 
apparent in Figure 4, which shows the location of all called strikes.  A strike generally 
corresponds to the elliptical region centered around the plate and slightly below the batter’s 
waistline. We define three concentric ellipses corresponding to: 1) the inside of the strike zone, 
2) the edge of the strike zone, located just outside the center region, and 3) the complement to 
both regions, denoted as outside.  Figure 4 shows the inside, an ellipse with major axis equal to 2 
feet, and a minor axis equal to 1.6 feet.  The edge is bordered by the inside and the outside, a 
larger ellipse with major axis 2.6 feet and minor axis 2.2 feet. We experimented with several 
alternative sizes for these ellipses, and none changes the basic results.  Panel B of Table 6 
summarizes the distribution of pitches by region. Roughly 40 percent are thrown in each of the 
inside and outside regions, with the balance in the edge.  
Pitches thrown to each region generate different outcomes.  A called pitch in the inside 
region will be a strike almost 87 percent of the time.  Thus, a pitch thrown in this region is 
associated with little uncertainty.  Similarly, a pitch thrown in the outside region has very little 
chance of being called a strike (3.8 percent), resulting in even less uncertainty about the call.  A 
pitch thrown to the edge region, however, is called a strike 44.3 percent of the time, generating 
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nearly the maximum uncertainty possible for a binomial variable. The edge region allows the 
umpire the greatest discretion.  
 Given this distinction, it is comforting that the edge is where the effects of the previous 
sections occur.  Matches in the inside are associated with an increase in the called strike 
percentage of only 0.3 percentage points, from 86.7 percent (no match) to 87 percent (match).  
The outside shows no difference at all.  The percent called strikes in the edge is 43.6 absent a 
match, compared to 44.5 percent with a match.  If pitchers understand this advantage, then we 
can predict that a matching pitcher will throw more pitches to the edge, where his advantage 
(courtesy of a biased umpire) is maximized.  This aids the pitcher, because pitches to this region 
are considerably more difficult for the batter to hit. 
Panel C of Table 6 presents the results of regressions similar to (1), except: 1) we include 
all pitches thrown by starting pitchers, not just called pitches, as was required for the previous 
analysis; and 2) the dependent variable indicates whether a pitch is thrown to the edge.  As 
before, we include fixed effects for each pitcher, umpire, and batter, as well as all count and 
inning indicators.  The first column shows the result for pitchers in QuesTec parks, where we see 
that a race/ethnicity match between the pitcher and umpire has virtually no effect on pitch 
location.  In non-QuesTec parks, the situation changes drastically.  Matches lead to a 0.95 
percentage-point increase in the probability of throwing to the middle region, representing a 5 
percent increase relative to the base non-match rate of 19.7 percent.  The third column 
aggregates all observations, where the magnitude of the interaction term is over 1 percent 
(p=.10).  By throwing pitches that can reasonably be called as either balls or strikes, matching 
pitchers gamble on the fact that this region offers them an advantage.   
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Panel D of Table 6 shows a related, but distinct, finding.  Its interpretation requires some 
institutional detail.  The most common pitch in baseball is the fastball (about 58 percent of our 
sample), which travels in a mostly straight line from the pitcher’s hand toward home plate.  
Skilled pitchers, however, can place spin on pitches, causing them to deviate from a straight 
trajectory.  Pitches with substantial “break” end their flights with dramatic dips that are 
notoriously difficult to hit solidly.  Adding this vertical element also makes these pitches more 
difficult to judge.23 As with pitches to the edge, judging a curveball requires subjectivity, which 
is the source of a matching pitcher’s advantage.  If matching pitchers are aware of a biased 
umpire, we would expect them to throw more breaking pitches. 
The first column in Panel D shows that, in QuesTec parks, a match is associated with a 
slight preference for breaking balls.  In non-QuesTec parks, the magnitude quadruples to 1.28 
percent (p<0.001).  The aggregation of all pitches in Column (3) tells the same story.  Matching 
pitchers in parks without explicit monitoring select pitches allowing umpires the most discretion, 
enabling them to maximize their advantage stemming from the umpire's bias.  While Panel D 
only makes the distinction between curveballs and other pitches, the result is nearly identical if 
we distinguish between all breaking pitches (e.g, sliders, cutters) and fastballs.  
 The Appendix presents a simple game-theoretic model that formalizes the intuition for 
the results in Table 6.  It shows that, when pitchers expect a racial/ethnic match with the umpire 
to result in more called strikes, their optimal response is to select pitch locations further from the 
center of the plate (as shown in Table 6).   Intuitively, the umpire’s bias reduces the penalty for 
throwing edge pitches that are difficult for the batter to hit. 
                                                 
23A Google search for “umpire” and “calling a curveball” generates hundreds of links to articles and advice to 
umpires wishing to master the evaluation of this difficult pitch. 
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 The results and the general theory seem relevant for examining the effect of bias on 
agents’ behavior in a variety of contexts.  For example, in the literature on racial profiling (e.g., 
John Knowles et al, 2001; Nicola G. Persico, 2002), while the search data in the empirical 
literature do not allow examining these indirect effects, the theory demonstrates that they will 
arise.  On the reverse side, the theory of affirmative action (Stephen Coate and Glenn C. Loury, 
1993) demonstrates that anti-discriminatory policies will produce indirect effects on agents’ 
behavior. 
 In the larger labor market the history of occupational segregation is replete with examples 
of discrimination in occupational choice altering agents’ labor-market behavior to their own 
detriment.  The exclusion of Jews from property ownership in the late Middle Ages, the 
exclusion of African-Americans from most of the railway trades until the 1950s, and perhaps 
even the “glass ceilings” in corporate hierarchies, all resulted in crowding into occupations (see 
Barbara R. Bergmann, 1971) that was an indirect effect of bias in other occupations.  Our work 
merely provides a specific example of these effects that allows them to be identified more clearly 
than in the broader labor-market context.  
VI.  Measures of Performance and the Measurement of Discrimination 
The model in the Appendix and evidence in Section V jointly imply that, conditional on 
swinging, the batter is less likely to get a hit when the umpire and pitcher match.  This 
implication suggests analyzing a variety of game-level performance measures for each starting 
pitcher to infer the total of the direct and indirect effects of bias on performance.  Table 7 
examines each starting pitcher’s hits allowed, runs given up, and wins (per game).24  Because the 
                                                 
24We tabulate each starting pitcher’s win decisions rather than whether the team actually wins the game.  If one 
considers this second measure instead, the differences are similar, although the overall mean is 0.5 by construction.  
(The mean for wins is lower in the text table because relief pitchers are frequently awarded decisions.) 
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sample shrinks by nearly three orders of magnitude compared to the pitch-level results, our 
ability to detect relatively subtle effects is greatly reduced.  Nonetheless, for both groups (non-
Hispanic Whites in Panel A, minorities in Panel B), pitchers’ outcomes along all three game-
level performance measures are superior in matching situations.  Non-Hispanic White starting 
pitchers who match are awarded wins 1.7 percentage points more often in non-QuesTec parks, 
which reverses to negative 3 percentage points in QuesTec parks.  The “QuesTec effect” of 4.6 
percentage points is nearly significant (p=.08).  For minority starting pitchers, the similar gap is 
even larger, at 12.9 percentage points (p=.06), although there are only 74 matches in QuesTec 
parks. 
Several other aggregate performance measures show the same patterns.  Both groups give 
up fewer hits in matching situations in non-QuesTec parks, Whites by about 1 percentage point, 
minorities by about 2 percentage points.  As before, each pattern reverses in QuesTec parks.  A 
similar pattern is seen along additional performance metrics.  Figure 5 shows several of them, 
again for non-Questec parks and for White and minority pitchers separately.  Presented as 
percentage changes from their baseline levels (Table 7 presented differences in levels), the vast 
majority improve in match situations.  From the starting pitcher’s perspective, a racial/ethnic 
match with the umpire helps his earned runs (fewer), hits (fewer), walks (fewer), and home runs 
(fewer).  Only strikeouts go in the opposite direction. One might expect little effect for 
strikeouts, which, at least in the fraction that are called third strikes, require bias on a terminal 
count, which we have already shown does not occur. 
 To the extent that pay is based on measured productivity, our findings of small direct and 
larger indirect effects of racially/ethnically disparate treatment carry important implications for 
measuring the extent of discrimination in baseball and in labor markets generally. In particular, 
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they imply that estimates of the extent of discrimination will be understated, even controlling for 
standard measures of performance.   
 Consider a simple earnings equation: 
    Wi = αMi + βP*i  + υi ,                                                       (2) 
where W is the logarithm of earnings, M an indicator of minority status, P* worker i’s true 
productivity, and υ a random error in the determination of earnings.  The parameter α is the true 
effect of minority status on earnings when productivity measurements are free of bias. Assume 
that the majority workers’ productivity is measured without bias, but that minority workers are 
subject to a negative bias in their assessment by evaluators, which leads to a shortfall of their 
measured productivity P below their true productivity: 
     Pi  = P*i  - φ,  if M=1;                                                        (3) 
     Pi  = P*i  ,      if M=0, 
φ>0.  Then we can rewrite (2) to obtain an estimating equation in observables: 
     Wi = [α+βφ]Mi + βPi  + υi , or                                               (2’) 
Wi = α’Mi + βPi  + υi. 
The standard estimate of earnings discrimination adjusted for productivity differences, α’, has a 
positive bias in the amount βφ. 
 To obtain some feel for the size of this bias in the particular case that we have examined, 
we can simulate the wage effects using the estimates of φ underlying Figure 5 and estimates of β 
from three studies of MLB that examined pitchers and used at least some of these outcomes as 
determinants of salaries.  We are essentially estimating the reduction in minority pitchers’ 
salaries as a result of the average amount of bias arising during the 2004-2008 seasons due to 
umpire-pitcher racial/ethnic matches. Lawrence M. Kahn (1993, Table A2) estimates equations 
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like (2’) using a set of outcome measures that can be conformed to ours by including the 
percentage of games won and ERA.  Making reasonable assumptions about the means of these 
outcomes for starting pitchers in 2004-2008, applying the effects in Figure 5, and using his 
parameter estimates yields an estimated bias of βφ = 0.034.  Mark P. Gius and Timothy P. Hylan 
(1996, Table 6.2) use strikeouts/inning, walks/inning and winning percentage, all of which are 
also conformable with our outcome measures.  The same method based on their parameter 
estimates produces an estimate of βφ = 0.012. Finally, using the estimates for starting pitchers by 
Anthony C. Krautmann et al (2003), the estimate of βφ = 0.074.25 
 While we have demonstrated the extent of bias to estimated discrimination in earnings 
that arises because of biased evaluations of MLB pitchers, this effect is probably smaller than 
would be observed for workers generally.  The scope for the expression of racial/ethnic 
preferences of umpires for/against pitchers is almost surely far less than in most workplaces. 
Evaluations of pitchers are made discretely and very frequently—when a pitch is thrown.  These 
are not one-shot comments made at most monthly at the evaluator’s leisure.  Also, as our 
demonstrations of reduced bias when there is greater scrutiny suggest, there are quite stringent 
external limits on the expression of bias against unmatched pitchers.  The relative lack of such 
limits in the general workplace suggests that the example here may provide a lower bound on the 
extent of bias to estimates of disparate outcomes generally.  
The general point, that bias will affect measures of productivity, is not new (see, e.g., 
Glen G. Cain, 1986).  It is, however, generally ignored in the scholarly literature measuring the 
                                                 
25We use the means in this sample as the baselines. For the fraction of games won, 0.37; for ERA, 4.44; for 
strikeouts/inning by starting pitchers, 0.75; and for walks/inning, 0.43. We can take the estimates of the bias as 
examples here to infer the dollar impacts of this subtle form of discrimination.  In 2006, the mid-point of our sample, 
the average salary of starting pitchers in MLB was $4.8 million.  A bias to the estimated effect of minority status on 
compensation of starting pitchers of between 1 and 8 percent suggests that those pitchers are underpaid relative to 
White pitchers by between $50,000 and $400,000 per year. 
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wage effects of discrimination.  In the huge industry of employment litigation, standard practice 
is to adjust wages using measures of supervisors’ evaluations of workers.  As we have shown, 
even in a very controlled and highly scrutinized environment, these can be biased against 
minorities. Our results suggest that this bias must be accounted for whenever one wishes to 
measure racial/ethnic disparities in rewards in the workplace. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
The analyses of individual pitches and game outcomes suggest that baseball umpires 
express racial/ethnic preferences in their decisions about players’ performances. Pitches are 
slightly more likely to be called strikes when the umpire shares the race/ethnicity of the starting 
pitcher, an effect that only is observable when umpires’ behavior is not well monitored. The 
evidence also suggests that this bias has substantial effects on pitchers’ measured performance 
and games’ outcomes.  The link between the small and large effects arises, at least in part, 
because pitchers alter their behavior in potentially discriminatory situations in ways that 
ordinarily would disadvantage themselves (such as throwing pitches directly over the plate). As 
in many other fields, racial/ethnic preferences work in all directions—most people give 
preference to members of their own group.  In MLB, as in so many other fields of endeavor, 
power belongs disproportionately to members of the majority—White—group. 
The type of discrimination that we have demonstrated is disturbing because of its 
implications for the sports labor market.  In particular, minority pitchers are at a significant 
disadvantage relative to their White peers, even in the absence of explicit wage discrimination by 
teams.  Although some evidence suggests such explicit discrimination exists, i.e., there is a wage 
gap among baseball players of different races, the fact that almost 90 percent of the umpires are 
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White implies that the measured productivity of minority pitchers may be downward biased.  
Implicitly, estimates of wage discrimination in baseball that hold measured productivity (at least 
of pitchers) constant will understate its true size. 
 More generally, our results suggest caution in interpreting any estimates of wage 
discrimination stemming from equations relating earnings to race/ethnicity, even with a large set 
of variables designed to control for differences in productivity.  To the extent that supervisors’ 
evaluations are among the control variables included in estimates of wage discrimination, or 
even if they only indirectly alter workers’ objective performances, their inclusion or their mere 
existence contaminates attempts to infer discrimination from adjusted racial/ethnic differences in 
wages.  If racial/ethnic preferences in evaluator-worker matches are important, standard 
econometric estimates will generally understate the magnitude of racial/ethnic discrimination in 
labor markets. 
While the specific evidence of racial/ethnic match preferences is disturbing, our novel 
analysis of the expression of discrimination should be encouraging:  When their decisions matter 
more, and when evaluators are themselves more likely to be evaluated by others, our results 
suggest that these preferences no longer manifest themselves.  Indeed, these findings imply that 
the particular impacts of racial/ethnic match preferences in baseball may now have been vitiated, 
since beginning in 2009 all ballparks are equipped with QuesTec or similar technologies.26 
Clearly, however, raising the price of discrimination in the labor market generally is more 
difficult; but our results may suggest analogous measures that might have the desired effects. 
                                                 
26 See “Ball-Strike Monitor May Reopen Wounds” (Alan Schwarz, New York Times, March 1, 2009, electronic 
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Table 1–Summary Statistics of Pitches 
 














All 3,524,624 17.09 36.56 8.98 17.08 19.41 0.63 0.25 
Pitcher                 
   White (N=861) 2,544,515 17.19 36.48 8.77 17.10 19.58 0.64 0.24 
   Hispanic (N=278) 793,797 16.86 36.77 9.57 17.03 18.86 0.64 0.27 
   Black (N=37) 89,355 16.24 36.68 9.71 17.54 19.07 0.52 0.24 
   Asian (N=39) 96,957 17.12 36.81 8.87 16.59 19.70 0.64 0.27 
Batter                 
   White (N=1,147) 1,813,768 17.37 36.90 9.11 16.92 18.84 0.58 0.28 
   Hispanic (N=493) 1,061,115 16.81 35.91 8.72 17.35 20.31 0.68 0.22 
   Black (N=187) 571,563 16.65 36.67 9.17 17.08 19.50 0.70 0.23 
   Asian (N=46) 78,178 17.63 36.80 7.44 17.35 19.88 0.71 0.19 
Umpire                 
   White (N=91) 3,215,949 17.09 36.55 8.97 17.09 19.41 0.64 0.25 
   Hispanic (N=5) 111,524 17.06 36.80 8.87 16.97 19.33 0.70 0.27 
   Black (N=6) 197,151 17.13 36.63 9.00 16.99 19.44 0.59 0.22 
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  Pitcher Race/Ethnicity   Total percent 
called strikes   White Hispanic  Black Asian   
Umpire Race/Ethnicity       
White       
   Pitches 2,319,522 726,137 81,251 89,039   
   Called pitches 1,244,523 389,411 42,986 47,973   
   Called strikes 398,673 122,441 13,194 15,269   
   Percent called strikes  32.03 31.44 30.69 31.83  31.86 
Hispanic           
   Pitches 80,956 24,844 2,559 3,165   
   Called pitches 43,632 13,299 1,374 1,760   
   Called strikes 13,857 4,194 429 549   
   Percent called strikes 31.76 31.54 31.22 31.19  31.68 
Black           
   Pitches 144,037 42,816 5,545 4,753   
   Called pitches 77,472 23,035 2,922 2,561   
   Called strikes 24,900 7,195 886 784   
   Percent called strikes 32.14 31.24 30.32 30.61  31.86 
             
Total percent called 
strikes 




Table 3–Effects on Called Strikes of the Relationship between Pitcher and Umpire Race/Ethnicity, 
MLB 2004-2008  
 
A.  Main Parameter Estimates 
Pitchers  White Black Hispanic All All All All All All 
Umpires  All All All White Black Hispanic All All All 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Black Umpire  -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0010         
(0.0019) (0.0105) (0.0031)    
Hispanic Umpire -0.0045 0.0097 0.0079         
(0.0024) (0.0127) (0.0049)    
Black Pitcher      -0.0148 -0.0157 -0.0027     
   (0.0023) (0.0103) (0.0125)   
Hispanic Pitcher      -0.0072 -0.0089 0.0020     
   (0.0009) (0.0034) (0.0054)   
UPM          0.0024 0.0021 0.0016 
        (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Observations  1,365,660 47,285 425,731  1,676,942 103,429 58,305  1,838,676
R2  0.031 0.031 0.030  0.028 0.025 0.030  0.031 0.091 0.091 
Fixed Effects  P P P  U U U  P PU PUB 
 
B.  Coefficients on Pitch Count Indicators in the Specification in Column (9) 
 0&1 0&2  1&0 1&1 1&2  2&0 2&1 2&2  3&0 3&1 3&2  
 -0.226 -0.355  -0.023 -0.190 -0.326  0.042 -0.151 -0.289  0.206 -0.060 -0.257  
 (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)  
 
C.  Coefficients on Inning Indicators and Pitcher's Score Advantage in the Specification in Col. (9) 
 







 -0.010 -0.024  -0.032 -0.032 -0.034  -0.025 -0.024 -0.018  0.006 0.002  
 (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.0004)  
 
Notes: All estimates are based on linear-probability models with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses, here and in Tables 4-6. UPM indicates whether the umpire and pitcher match on race/ethnicity. The 
control variables whose coefficients are reported Panels B and C are included in all the estimates. Pitcher Score 
Advantage is the number of runs, potentially negative, that the pitcher’s team is ahead at the time of the pitch. Top 
of Inning is an indicator equaling 1 if the home team is pitching. P, U and B represent pitcher, umpire and batter 
fixed effects, respectively.   
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Table 4–Effects on Called Strikes of Explicit Monitoring of Umpires and Racial/Ethnic 
Discrimination, MLB 2004-2008  
  
 QuesTec Non-QuesTec All 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Umpire-Pitcher Match (UPM) -0.0048 0.0059 0.0059 
 (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
    
QuesTec*UPM   -0.0107 
     (0.0035) 
Observations 679,979 1,158,697 1,838,676 
R2 0.089 0.088 0.088 
 
Notes: UPM indicates whether the umpire and pitcher match on race/ethnicity. All columns here and in Tables 5 and 
6 include the control variables shown in Table 3. All columns also include fixed effects: 1) pitcher-QuesTec fixed 
effects, i.e., two fixed effects for each pitcher who pitched in both a ballpark where QuesTec was and was not 
installed; 2) umpire-QuesTec fixed effects, and 3) batter-QuesTec fixed effects.  
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Table 5–Effects on Called Strikes of Implicit Monitoring of Umpires and Racial Discrimination, 
MLB 2004-2008  
  
A. Distinguishing by Game Attendance 
 High Attendance Low Attendance All Games 
 (1) (2) (3) 
UPM -0.0034 0.0064 0.0036 
     (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0019) 
Well Attended ( >69% capacity)   0.0059 
       (0.0012) 
Well Attended*UPM   -0.0037 
          (0.0015) 
Observations 902,261 936,415 1,838,676 
R2 0.089 0.088 0.088 
 
B. Distinguishing by Terminal Count and Inning 
 Terminal Non-Terminal All Pitches  Early Inning Late Inning 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UPM -0.0026 0.0031 0.0031 0.0044 0.0023 
 (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0022) 
Terminal Count   -0.0058 -0.0086 -0.0038 
   *UPM     (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0017) 
Observations 427,136 1,411,540 1,838,676 641,053 1,197,623 
R2 0.175 0.042 0.088 0.095 0.085 
 
C.  Combining Explicit and Implicit Monitoring Proxies 
    UPM Interacted with    
 




Count  Observations R2 
 All Pitches 0.0089 -0.0102 -0.0035 -0.0058  1,838,676 0.088 
 (9) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0015) (0.0014)    
 
Note: Low (high) attendance games are defined as games with percentage attendance below (above) the median.  A 
terminal count is defined as a count with three balls and/or two strikes. 
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Table 6–Pitch Location, Type and the Effects of Pitcher-Umpire Racial/Ethnic Matches, MLB 
2007-2008  
  
A. Pitch Locations (Distance from Home-plate Center), 2007-2008, N=538,194  
 Mean Quantiles: 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
Horizontal Pitch Distance (ft.) -0.04  -1.53 -0.68 -0.04 0.60 1.44 
Pitch Height (ft.) -0.11  -1.60 -0.69 -0.10 0.48 1.36 
 
B. Percentage Distributions of Pitches by Type, 2007-2008, N=533,150  
By Location  By Type 
Inside Edge Outside  Change-up Curveball Fastball Slider Other 
39.55 19.98 40.47  13.43 10.88 57.48 13.52 4.69 
         
C. Effects on Probability of Pitch in the Edge of the Strike Zone 
 Questec Non-Questec All Games 
 (1) (2) (3) 
UPM -0.0005 0.0095 0.0095 
     (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Questec*UPM   -0.0102 
         (0.0063) 
Observations 199,085 339,109 538,194 
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
D. Effects on Probability of a Curve Ball  
 Questec Non-Questec All Games 
 (4) (5) (6) 
UPM 0.0033 0.0128 0.0125 
     (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
Questec*UPM   -0.0087 
         (0.0043) 
Observations  195,777 337,373 533,150 
R2 0.020 0.021 0.021 
 
Notes: The sample consists of all pitches (called and non-called, excluding intentional balls) thrown by starting 
pitchers   In Panel A the pitch location is the Cartesian coordinate, where the origin is the intersection of the vertical 
line from the center of the home plate and the horizontal line equidistant to the top and the bottom of the strike zone.  





Table 7–Estimated Effects on Performance of Umpire and Starting Pitcher Racial/Ethnic Match, 
N=12,127 Games, MLB 2004-2008   
  
A. White Pitchers  
 Umpire-Pitcher 
Racial Match N Win Hits Allowed Runs Allowed 
Questec Match 5,953 0.347 6.190 3.215 
 Non-Match 605 0.377 6.109 3.179 
 Diff   -0.030 0.081 0.036 
   (0.021) (0.102) (0.092) 
      
Non-Questec Match 10,491 0.351 6.174 3.154 
 Non-Match 1,003 0.334 6.240 3.234 
 Diff   0.017 -0.066 -0.080 
   (0.016) (0.073) (0.069) 
      
 Diff-in-Diff  -0.046 0.147 0.116 
   (0.026) (0.126) (0.115) 
 
B. Minority Pitchers  
 Umpire-Pitcher 
Racial Match N Win Hits Allowed Runs Allowed 
Questec Match 74 0.257 6.284 3.581 
 Non-Match 2,313 0.356 6.006 3.179 
 Diff   -0.099 0.278 0.402 
   (0.052) (0.297) (0.276) 
      
Non-Questec Match 119 0.370 5.891 3.185 
 Non-Match 3,696 0.340 6.080 3.223 
 Diff   0.030 -0.189 -0.038 
   (0.045) (0.226) (0.214) 
       
 Diff-in-Diff  -0.129 0.466 0.440 
   (0.069) (0.373) (0.349) 
 





















































Figure 2–Race and Called Strike Percentages by Game Attendance  
 



















































Figure 3–Race and Called Strike Percentages in Terminal and Non-Terminal Counts 
 





Figure 4–Called Strikes by Distance from Home-Plate Center, 2007-2008 (N=144,990) 
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Figure 5–Effects of Umpire-Pitcher Racial/Ethnic Match on Pitcher Performance,  
non-Questec Ballparks, MLB 2004-2008 (N=15,308) 
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Appendix– A Model of Bias-Induced Changes in Pitcher Strategies 
 
Consider the following simple representation of the interaction between the pitcher and 
hitter. Denote the horizontal distance from the center of the plate . Assume for simplicity that 
the pitcher can control the width of pitches (i.e., the horizontal dimension), but not their height. 
Further suppose that the batter is left-handed, and that the pitcher never aims left of center, i.e., 
. This simplifying assumption is little more than a normalization, although a realistic one, 
as pitchers are usually cautious to avoid hitting the batter.  
 
The game unravels as follows.  
1. The pitcher moves first. He can select his aim,  ≥ 0, but not the final pitch location, , 
which is random. On average, the pitcher’s aim is correct, i.e., E( ) = µ.  
2. The batter moves next. A batter must decide whether to swing or not soon after a pitch is 
thrown, but before it reaches its final location . To capture this timing, the batter’s 
swing decision is made immediately after observing µ.27 
3. If the batter does not swing, two outcomes are possible. For a given value of µ, with 
probability s(µ), the pitch is called a strike, and confers the batter a payoff S. With 
probability 1 − s(µ), the pitch is called a ball, with payoff B > S. We assume s´ < 0, s´´< 
0, i.e., that pitches aimed closer to the plate are more likely to be called strikes, and at an 
increasing rate.  
4. If the batter swings, two additional outcomes are possible. With probability h(µ), the 
batter gets a hit, and enjoys a payoff H. With probability 1 − h(µ), the batter does not get 
a hit, with payoff N < H.28 Similar to the assumptions for s, we assume h´ < 0, h´´ < 0.  
  
The Batter’s Problem:  
To determine whether he swings at a pitch with expected location µ, the batter compares his 
expected payoff from swinging, 
                                          π(swing|µ) = h(µ)H + [1 – h(µ)]N
 
                                                    (1)  
                                                 
27This strict timing assumption is not crucial. Instead, it is a simplified way of modeling that the batter makes his 
swing decision under imperfect information. For example, the batter could instead observe a noisy signal of 
without changing the results.  









with that from not swinging, 
                                          π(no swing|µ) = s(µ)S + [1 –s(µ)]B.
                                                  
(2) 
Lemma 1.  Assume  ), = |)(> ) = |( 0 swingno0swing  so that a batter always prefers to 
swing at a pitch aimed down the center of the plate. Then there exists a unique cutoff M whereby 
if: i) , the batter strictly prefers to swing, ii) , the batter strictly prefers to not 
swing, and iii) , the batter is indifferent between swinging and not.  
Proof.  ∂(π(swing|µ)) / ∂µ < 0, which follows from the assumptions that: i) called strikes are 
assumed to be more likely when thrown closer to the plate, s´< 0, ii) the batter’s expected 
payoff from called balls is higher than that from called strikes, B > S. By similar logic,    
∂(π(no swing|µ)) / ∂µ > 0.  The convexity assumptions s´´, h´´< 0 then guarantee a single 
crossing for (π (swing) |µ) and (π (no swing) |µ), which we denote .  
 
The intuition for Lemma 1 is straightforward. Batters will not attempt to hit pitches that 
have very little chance of being called a strike should they not swing, i.e., for sufficiently low 
values of . Moreover, the cutoff for swinging  is a function of the payoffs S, B, H, and N that 
correspond to the possible outcomes of the plate appearance. Generally, these payoffs will 
depend on game conditions, such as the score, the count, runners on base, or other factors that 
determine the payoffs to each outcome. For example, with runners on second and third base but 
no outs, the benefit of a hit (H) is substantial, where the cost of hitting into an out (N) is 
relatively small. In this situation, the batter will be less selective at the plate, which increases the 
swinging cutoff . We do not model differences in these payoffs across plate appearances, 
although the present set-up easily allows for this extension.  
Our main interest is in how changes in the conditional strike function, s( ), influence 
the batter’s optimal behavior. Specifically, assume that the race/ethnicity match of the umpire 
and pitcher influences the probability that a pitch aimed at location µ will be called a strike. If 
the pitcher and umpire match (M), denote the conditional called strike probability . If they 
are different (D), the conditional strike probability becomes . To capture the idea that 
similar race or ethnicity helps the pitcher, we assume:  
 
sM(µ) > sD(µ),                                                             (3)                    
In other words, the same pitch has a different probability of being called a strike, conditional on 
whether the umpire and pitcher have the same or different races or ethnicities.  
 
 










Lemma 2.  When the pitcher and umpire share the same race/ethnicity, the batter swings at 
pitches further from the center of the plate. That is, the cutoff location under a match is strictly 
greater than the cutoff location otherwise, i.e., .  
Proof.  Denote  as the cutoff swinging location when  and  as that when 
. Suppose  and . From equation (2), when  changes to 
 the expected payoff of not swinging declines by 0, ))](ˆ()ˆ([ BSss MDMM   while 
the payoff from swinging is unchanged. We can now use the proof for Lemma 1. Because 
0   / ))|(( swing  and 0,   / ))|((  swingno  the new cutoff  is strictly less than 
.  
Lemma 2 indicates that when the batter anticipates judgments that favor the pitcher, his optimal 
strategy changes. Expecting the umpire’s bias to reduce his payoff from not swinging, the batter 
takes matters into his own hands by swinging at pitches that he would otherwise let pass. 
Empirically, this implies a distinct advantage to the pitcher, not only for pitches that are called, 
but also for pitches that are hit. We complete this exercise by extending consideration to the 
pitcher’s optimal strategy.  
The Pitcher’s Problem:  
The pitcher’s choice variable is , the expected location of the pitch. His expected 
payoff is the inverse of the batter’s. If the batter swings, then the pitcher’s expected payoff is                         
–h(µ)H–[1–h(µ)]N. If the batter does not swing, then his expected payoff is –s(µ)S–[1–s(µ)]B.  
Lemma 3.  The pitcher’s optimal pitch location is , so that the batter is indifferent between 
swinging and not.  
Proof.  The batter will swing at any pitch aimed at , but because 
0,   / ))|(( swing  the pitcher is always strictly better off  increasing µ given that the 
batter will swing. The batter will not swing at any pitch aimed at , but because 
0,   / ))|((  swingno  the pitcher will always decrease µ given that the batter will not 
swing. It follows then that the optimal pitch location must be .  
The main prediction is that the umpire’s bias influences not only called strikes and balls, 
but also pitches where the umpire’s judgment plays no direct role. Lemma 3 shows that the 
umpire’s judgment influences the choice of pitch location, which in turn influences the batter’s 
incentive to swing at the ball. It follows that conditional on swinging, the batter is less likely to 
hit the ball when the umpire and pitcher share race or ethnicity. As indicated by the model, this is 
because pitches are, on average, more difficult to hit in these situations. 
DM  ˆˆ 
M̂ )()(  Mss  D̂
)()(  Dss  )()(  Mss  M ˆ )(s
)(Ds
D̂
M̂

̂
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 ˆ
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